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R. Carl Moy*

THE INTERPRETATION OF MEANS
EXPRESSIONS DURING PROSECUTION

This type of encounter is familiar to many patent practitioners: An attorney is discussing a newly submitted claim,
which contains a "means plus function" expression as
described in the sixth paragraph of 35 U .S.c. § 112 1 , with an
examiner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO). The attorney points out that the prior art does not
contain the recited "means," say for example, "means for
travelling through space. " The examiner responds with the
assertion that the new claim is anticipated by a reference
already of record which discloses a shoe, observing that
"this shoe could travel through space if it were launched
upward fast enough, and so your means expression reads
on the reference."2
The scope assigned to means expressions by the PTO
during prosecution is of considerable importance, given the
widespread use of such expressions by patent practitioners.
The PTO's approach to their interpretation may be unduly
restrictive in view of the literal language of the statute, and
has the effect of forcing an applicant to address prior art
having no reasonable relationship to the subject matter that
would be protected by such an expression after issuance.
Recent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit suggest that the previously existing law
in this area may no longer be valid. Those decisions suggest
means expressions are to be interpreted during validity
determinations exactly as in infringement questions.

*Merchant, Gould, Smith, Edell, Welter & Schmidt, Minneapolis, Minn. The
views expressed herein are entirely those of the author.
1 "An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts
in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof."
35 U.S.C. §112 (1982). While the language of the paragraph, by referring to "structure, material, or acts," clearly is not intended to be limited to claims drawn to
inventions in any particular category of 35 U.S.C. Section 101, this article will
discuss the use of such language in claims drawn to articles of manufacture,
primarily for ease of illustration.
2 This fanciful example was offered by an Associate Solicitor during oral argument before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to illustrate
the PTO's view of how the scope of such expressions is determined.

-246-

HeinOnline -- 68 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 246 1986

Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society

This article briefly explains how the scope of a claim
including a means expression is determined both under the
PTO view and a strict application of the statutory language.
The lack of consensus and current state of the law in the
area are illustrated through an analysis of several recent
decisions ofthe Federal Circuit. The policies underlying the
PTO and statutory methods of interpreting means expressions during prosecution are examined in an effort to demonstrate that the statutory method more effectively furthers
the policies underlying the patent system.
I.
THE PTO AND STATUTORY METHODS OF INTERPRETATION

The use of functional language in patent claims to define
elements of an invention is very old. Prior to the enactment
of the Patent Act of 1952 (the '52 Act), these recitations
were generally understood to result in coverage, as to the
element so defined, broad enough to encompass all elements
capable of performing the recited function. 3 They were consequently used by practitioners to describe a portion of an
invention in terms that would result in a broad exclusive
right.
This broad coverage, however, often ran afoul of other
perceived statutory limits on the scope of a patentee's exclusive rights. Since such an expression covered all possible
means of achieving the recited result, it was argued, how
could they particularly point out and distinctly claim the
invention,4 or be supported by an enabling disclosure?S This
view is typified by the Supreme Court's decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,6 in which claims
found to use "conveniently functional language at the exact
point of novelty"7 were held to be invalid as indefinite.
3 Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245 (1928); Morse v.
Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). See generally 2 D. Chisum, Patents § 8.04
(1983).
4 Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245 (1928); Morse v.
Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
5 General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Co., 304 U.S. 364, 37 USPQ 466
(1938).
6 329 U.S. 1,71 USPQ 175 (1946).
7 [d. at 8, 71 USPQ at 178 (quoting General Electric v. Wabash Appliance, 304
U.S. 364, 371, 37 USPQ 466, 469).
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The sixth paragraph of35 U.S.C. §1128 was included in
the Patent Act of 1952 to ameliorate the results flowing from
Halliburton/ by explicitly authorizing the use of functional
language in patent claims drawn to a combination, provided
that the function is used to describe the ability ofa "means"
for its performance. Under the language of that paragraph,
a claim expressing an element in a combination as a means
for performing a specified function is defined as covering
"the corresponding structure ... described in the specification and equivalents thereof. "
The analysis employed when applying the statutory language to claims including a means expression can be illustrated by brief examination of Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor. 10
In that case, the patentee had alleged infringement of claims
drawn to an apparatus for detecting irregularities in the
thickness of rust preventative layers coating the outside of
pipes. The prior art had settled on the method of utilizing
the electrical insulating properties of the coating by wrapping a coil spring in an annulus about the circumference of
the pipe. When a large voltage difference was applied between
the spring and the pipe, variations in the thickness of the
insulation could be electrically detected when the spring
was dragged along the length of the pipe.
This system, however, suffered from a loss of accuracy
as the spring inevitably separated from the insulation due to
the uneven "pull" applied to various points of the spring by
its supporting frame. The patentee solved this problem by
devising an apparatus in which the spring was rolled, rather
than dragged, along the insulation layer. The movement was
much smoother, and the accuracy of detection correspondingly increased. The mechanism that was disclosed in the
specification for performing this function comprised a pusher
that included sets of rollers in contact with the outside diameter of the annular spring. The spring was held against the

8 At the time of enactment there were only three paragraphs in section 112.
Three additional paragraphs were inserted by Public Law No. 94-131, Section 7,
89 Stat. 685, 691 (Nov. 14, 1975) to authorize multiply-dependent claim practice.
The original third paragraph thereby became the sixth.
9 See notes 32 and 101, infra, and accompanying text.
!O 252 F.2d 589, 116 USPQ 222 (9th Cir. 1957).
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pipe by being seated between the sets of rollers, so that
when the pusher was moved along the axis of the pipe, the
spring rotated down the pipe's length.
The claims recited this mechanism as a "means rotatably engaging and forming a movable electrical contact with
[the] spring at a position remote from the surface of the
[pipe] for connecting said spring to a high voltage testing
circuit and for rolling said spring along such [pipe]." 11
The accused device also used a rolling annular spring
to detect imperfections in insulative coatings of pipes. However, instead of driving the spring by a wheeled pusher, the
accused device moved the spring along the length ofthe pipe
by a set of nonrotating pushers each having contacts closely
conforming to the coil diameter of the spring. The makers
of the accused device argued that the claims did not cover
their configuration since the patent disclosed only a wheeled
pusher. This contention was bolstered, they urged, by testimony of the inventor to the effect that he had considered
using non-wheeled pushers similar to the accused device
prior to executing his application, and discarded them as
inferior.
The Court in Stearns disagreed. It noted the statutory
language of § 112's last paragraph, and construed that section
to mean "that while an element in a claim for a combination
may be expressed as a means ... for performing a function
without recital of structure ... in support thereof; the structure ... must be described in the specification, and if so
described, the claim will be construed to cover that which
is described and the equivalent thereof." Therefore, the
Court concluded, "the structure [corresponding to the recited
function] need not as well be recited in the claim" to form
a limitation. Since the corresponding structure in the patentee's specification clearly did not include non-wheeled pushers, "[t]he question then becomes whether the rollers or
wheels shown in the specification ... are equivalent to the
... pusher-contactor of [the accused device]. "12

11 [d. at 592, 116 USPQ at 224.
12 [d. at 598, 116 USPQ at 228 (emphasis in original).
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The court answered this question by observing that
"both [the patented and accused devices] rotatably engage
the spring electrode so as to roll it along the pipe while
maintaining electrical contact between the spring electrode
and the high voltage unit." Consequently, and in view of
the district court's statements that the pushers "do substantially the same work" and "produce substantially the same
result," the court held that "the wheels or rollers employed
in [the patented device] are equivalent to the sleeve bearing
used in [the accused] device."13 The claims were therefore
held to be infringed.
While not cited at this point, the reasoning employed
by the court in Stearns clearly mirrors the often used l4 formulation of the doctrine of equivalents enunciated in Graver
Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 15 in
which the Supreme Court stated that "a patentee may invoke
this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device 'if
it performs substantially the same function in substantially
the same way to produce the same result' "16 as the patented
subject matter. Briefly, under this test an accused device
must simultaneously satisfy all three requirements of (i)
performing substantially the same function as the corresponding structure in the specification, (ii) in substantially
the same way as that structure, (iii) to produce the same
result. A failure to satisfy anyone of these requirements will
result in a finding that the accused device is outside the
claims's scope. 17

13 Id. 116 USPQ at 228-229.
14 E.g., Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969,226 USPQ 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 731 F.2d 840, 221 USPQ 657 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 119 (1984); Raytheon Co. v. Roper Co. 724 F.2d 951,
220 USPQ 592 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 127 (1984); Hughes Aircraft
v. U.S., 717 F.2d 1351, 219 USPQ 473 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Berea, S.P.A., Etc., 714 F.2d 1110,219 USPQ 185 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
15 339 U.S. 605, 85 USPQ 328 (1949).
16 Id. at 608, 85 USPQ at 330 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters,
280 U.S. 30, 42, 3 USPQ 40, 44 (1929) ).
17 Bolkom v. The Carborundum Co., 523 F.2d 492, 187 USPQ 466 (6th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); Deyerle v. Wright Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 45,
181 USPQ 685 (6th Cir. 1974); Blaw-Knox Co. v. Hartsville Oil Mill, 394 F.2d 877,
157 USPQ 475 (4th Cir. 1968); Bullard Co. v. General Electric Co., 348 F.2d 985,
146 USPQ 141 (4th Cir. 1965).
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The Court in Stearns was dealing with a question of
infringement, not validity, and until recently cases strictly
applying the statutory language of the sixth paragraph of
section 112 in validity questions were rare. 18 This is undoubtedly because the PTO and Federal Circuit precedents, as
discussed below, have historically treated means expressions during prosecution without regard to the statutory
language.
On those occasions when the language of the sixth paragraph is used to interpret a claim's scope during validity
determinations, the method is very similar to that used by
the Court in Stearns. 19 When a court, confronted with a
combination claim including a recitation of a means for performing a specified function, decides to apply the statutory
language, it ascertains what structure in the specification
corresponds to the function recited in the claim and compares that structure to the relevant prior art. If the court
determines that the corresponding structure is both novel
and unobvious, the question then is whether the prior art
discloses or makes obvious any equivalents of that corresponding structure. Just as in infringement determinations,
the determination of equivalents during prosecution is the
same as, or at least closely parallel to , that in Graver Tank:
Does the prior art disclose or make obvious a device that
performs substantially the same function as the corresponding structure in the specification, in substantially the same
way, to obtain the same result?
The paradigm applied by the PTO to means expressions
is quite different. The space shoe illustration offered above
highlights the PTO practice of disregarding the statutory
language when determining the scope of claims including a
means-plus-function expression.
Instead, the PTO has continued to interpret the scope
of these expressions in a manner very similar to the standard

18 Only two such cases are known to the author to have applied this standard
prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit. They are Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City
of Pontiac, 717 F.2d 269, 219 USPQ 1162 (6th Cir. 1983), discussed infra, and
Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 550 F.2d 992, 193 USPQ 257 (4th CiL),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
19 See id.
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prevailing before the '52 Act. The PTO's position is that
only the literal language of the means expression is limiting
during prosecution. A Claim including a means expression
therefore, under the PTO's view, encompasses, or "reads
on," every means for achieving the recited function. 20 Every
structure or device that performs the recited function anticipates the means expression, regardless of what corresponding structure is disclosed in the specification or what its
equivalents are.
A problem surfaces with the PTO view when the prior
art disclosure under consideration contains structure that
would be adequate to perform the recited function, but does
not disclose or make obvious its actual performance. Many
examiners are reluctant to allow a claim drawn to an apparatus based solely on the absence of a teaching of how that
apparatus is to be used. This reluctance is reinforced by a
line of Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)21 decisions enunciating the well settled rule that recitations of
intended use cannot impart patentability to an otherwise
unpatentable claim drawn to an apparatus. 22
The PTO corrects this anomaly by expanding the art
that will anticipate the recited means expression to include
any disclosure containing structure capable of performing
the recited function. This is the basis for the examiner's
position in the example at the beginning of this article that
the recitation of a "means for travelling through space"
only requires the application of a reference disclosing a shoe,
since that shoe is capable of travelling through space.

20 E.g., Ex parte Coady, 172 USPQ 83 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1970) (" 'Means'
covers all means capable of performing the stated function, and is not limited to
the structure disclosed in the application. "); Ex parte Machlanski, 111 USPQ 459
(Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1959). See also P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals ch.
4, Sec. 4 (1975); Commentaria, Functional Claims, 37 JPOS 753 (1955). For a
recent description of the PTO view, see Manzo, Means Claims in Patent Infringement Litigation, 68 J.P.O.S. 97, 110-11 (March 1986).
21 The decisions of the CCPA and the Court of Claims are precedents in the
Federal Circuit. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 215 USPQ 657 (Fed.
Cir. 1982).
22 E.g., In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA 1974); In re Mason,
240 F.2d 362, 114 USPQ 127 (CCPA 1957); In re Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947,99 USPQ
123 (CCPA 1953). The PTO has indicated its acceptance of this view in its Manual
of Patent Examining Procedure Section 706.03(c) (5th ed. 1983).
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II.
PRE-FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASE LAw
Shortly after the enactment of the '52 Act, it was suggested that the language of the last paragraph of section 112
prescribed the method of interpreting means expressions
during both infringement and validity determinations. 23 About
this same time, attempts were made to secure the allowance
of means expressions by arguing that the statute now compelled a narrow interpretation. 24
The first of these cases to be ruled on by the CCPA was
In re Arbeit. 25 The applicants in Arbeit were attempting to
claim a glass-making furnace which carried molten glass
sequentially from one portion ofthe furnace to another through
conduits that were small enough to prevent any backflow.
They relied on the following claim language to overcome a
prior art rejection:
[C]onduit means having a flow rate related to the flow rate [of
finished glass withdrawn from the furnace] so that the normal
operation [of the furnace] produces in the conduit means a glass
velocity having a minimum in the range from several mm to 1 cm
per second. 26
It was the PTO's opinion that this language was a statement
of operation, defining no "positive structure by which the
claims may be distinguished from the prior art. The flow
rate is not structure. "27
On appeal, the CCPA viewed the applicants as contending that "under the phraseology of the last paragraph
[of section 112], it is proper to look to purely functional
limitations expressed in claims for novelty to support patentability." It viewed the Solicitor as taking "a position which,
in our opinion, if adopted, requires a holding that in cases

23 E.g., Commentaria, Functional Claims, 37 J.P.O.S. 753 (1955).
24 E.g., In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 113 U.S.P.Q. 530 (CCPA 1957); In re
Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947, 99 U.S.P.Q. 123 (CCPA 1957). See Ex parte Ball, 99 U.S.P.Q.
146 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1953).
25 206 F.2d 947, 99 USPQ 123 (CCPA 1953).
26 206 F.2d at 948, 99 USPQ at 124.
27 Id. at 951,99 USPQ at 127.
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where purely functional limitations constitute the sole matter relied upon for novelty, the phraseology . . . has no
application, and the matter is governed by the first and
second paragraphs. "28
After observing that under prior law, functional language could not be solely relied upon for patentability, the
Court addressed the effect the last paragraph of then newly
enacted section 112 had on its conclusion. "It seems obvious
to us that the construction of that paragraph, such as appellant contends for, would render it wholly inconsistent with
the first and second paragraphs which ... are explicit and
mandatory in requiring a written description expressed in
'full, clear, concise, and exact terms' in the specification,
and so set forth in the claims.' '29 In other words, despite the
language of the last paragraph of section 112, the applicant's
means expression continued to read on all structures capable
of performing the recited function. The rejection was therefore affirmed.
The issue was addressed even more squarely in In re
Lundberg,30 where the applicants contended both that (1)
their claim language describing a support holding an instrument in an airplane as "adapted automatically to stabilize
[the instrument] in relation to the level and orientation
regardless of motions of the airplane" was equivalent to a
recitation of a means for performing the function, and (2) as
such, the language had to be construed as limited to the
corresponding structure described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
The Court agreed to assume that the "adapted" language was equivalent to the statutory language of a means
plus function and found that the function recited was present
in the prior art.
Therefore, unless the ... third [now sixth] paragraph of § 112 is
to be construed to mean that ... the claims may, through the
medium of a "means" clause, be held to include the limitations
which comprise said means and which are set forth in the disclo-

28 Id. at 956, 99 USPQ at 130.
29 Id. at 958,99 USPQ at 131 (emphasis in original).
30 244 F.2d 543, 113 USPQ 530 (CCPA 1957).
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sure, we must reject appellants' contentions as to the effect of
§1l2 on the claims in this case. 31
The Court decided against the applicants, rejecting their
second contention for two reasons. First, after recognizing
that the authorizing of means expressions was designed to
introduce a greater amount of liberality in the use of functional expressions in the wake of Halliburton, 32 it stated
that "Congress did not intend, by incorporating the [last]
paragraph into § 112, to destroy certain basic precepts of
patent law. "33 It then found that the second paragraph, by
directing that the claims "particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter" sought to be patented,
continued to require that the claims themselves literally
define the invention, citing Arbeit. 34
Second, the court observed that patent applicants are
free to present claims of varying breadth during prosecution.
It is at once obvious that appellant's intended construction of the
phrase under consideration would eliminate the distinction between
a combination claim whose elements are recited broadly as means
for performing a specified function and a combination claim in
which the same elements are recited in detail
since incorporating the corresponding structure described
in the specification into the means expression would make
the coverage afforded by these two claims effectively indistinguishable. 35
The Court then held that the literal language of the
claims must support patentability "without limitations
imported from the specification, whether such language is
couched in terms of means plus function or consists of a
detailed recitation of the inventive [claimed] matter. "36
Following these precedents, the PTO has developed a
long line of decisions 37 that refuse to apply the statutory

31 244 F.2d at 547,113 USPQ at 533.
32 See Ex parte Bal/, 99 USPQ 146 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1953).
33 244 F.2d at 547,113 USPQ at 534.
341d.
35 ld. at 548, 113 USPQ at 534.
36 ld.
37 See footnote 20, supra.
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language. These cases often announce and apply the rule
with little or no discussion of the merits of either side.

III.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS

As alluded to briefly at the beginning of this article, the
continued viability of the PTa's approach to means expressions has been called into question by recent decisions of
the Federal Circuit. These decisions reveal the Federal Circuit's uncertainty over what interpretive method should be
used to ascertain the scope of means expressions during
prosecution and validity determinations.
The first opinion of the Federal Circuit discussing this
issue, In re MulderS suggested that the PTa standard was
incorrect. There, the Federal Circuit was faced with the
question whether to affirm the PTa's rejection of a claimed
invention as obvious over the prior art. The invention was
a particular form of an integrated injection logic circuit.
These circuits contain many logic gate circuits, each gate
circuit comprising one NPN and one PNP-type transistor.
Since the collector of each transistor in a particular gate
circuit is connected with the base of the other, portions of
the transistors can share common regions of the doped semiconductor material out of which they are formed. A principal object of the invention in Mulder was to arrange the
semiconductor material in a manner that facilitated the use
of computer-aided design techniques.
The applicants had chosen to formulate dependent claim
9 to include a recitation of' 'means to reduce the input series
resistance of the gate circuits." The PTa asserted that the
arrangement disclosed in one of the applied references comprised such means.
The Court paused to dwell on the rejection of this
dependent claim and its means expression only briefly in its
opinion. "With respect to claim 9, we note that it is drafted
in 'means plus function' format, so that it is 'construed to
cover the corresponding structure. . . described in the specification, and equivalents thereof.' "39 This appears to be a
38 716 F.2d 1542, 219 USPQ 189 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
39 [d. at 1549, 219 USPQ at 196.

-256-

HeinOnline -- 68 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 256 1986

Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society

strict application of the statutory language along the lines
advocated in this article. No authority beyond the statute
was cited for the position.
However, the Court found that the narrower scope
assigned to the claim did not save it. "Appellants have
neither asserted nor shown that the [prior art] structure is
not the equivalent of the structure disclosed in their specification. "40 Consequently, the rejection was affirmed.
In its next opinion on the topic, the Federal Circuit
expressly used the PTO's approach to determine the scope
of a means expression. This was in RCA Corp. v. Applied
Digital Data Systems, 41 where the court reviewed a district
court's determination that certain claims of an issed patent
were anticipated by the prior art. The invention in RCA
involved a system for making character spaces on a television screen display given characters in response to digital
symbol codes representing a message. Each character space
of the television screen was comprised of a dot matrix, the
individual dots within each matrix being defined by positions
along horizontal scan lines. By using "position counts" to
specify the position of the dot being addressed, the electron
scanning beam of the television was turned on and off at
appropriate points, illuminating selected dots of the matrix
to display the given character.
Claim 1 of the patent recited four means-pIus-function
elements, one ofthem being "means for generating position
counts which occur successively during a scan along a scanline through a character space. "42
The asserted prior art was also a system for generating
characters on a cathode ray tube. In that system, the electron beam of the cathode ray tube was turned on and off by
electrical signals from a yoke that physically traversed a line
of cores in unison with the electron beam. By "reading" the
electromagnetic pattern of the cores, a corresponding pattern was produced on the television screen.

40 [d.
41 730 F.2d 1440, 221 USPQ 385 (Fed. Gr.), cert. dismissed, 105 S.Ct. 32
(1984).
42 [d. at 1445,221 USPQ at 387.
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In deciding the issue of anticipation, the Court first
described what it felt to be the correct legal standard to be
applied by a district court determining validity. "[W]ith an
element expressed in terms of a means plus function, 'absent
structure [in a prior art reference] which is capable of performing the functional limitation of the 'means', [the prior
art reference] does not meet the claim.' "43 This language is
a reiteration of the PTO view, holding that only the literal
language of the means expression is limiting when determining validity. As the Court stated in a footnote: "The claims
have defined the invention in terms of several 'means-plusfunction' elements. The limitations which must be met by
an anticipating reference are those set forth in each statement of function."44
The Court then determined that the prior art device was
not an anticipation. "The yokes do not keep track of the
position of any counts. Most importantly, the yokes do not
generate position counts as specifically required in claim
1. "45 Therefore, the Court concluded, the yokes ofthe prior
art device' 'do not meet the limitations of this means, since
they do not function in substantially the same way as a
position count generating means. "46
The Federal Circuit's next encounter with the PTO's
method of interpreting means expressions took place in the
context of an appeal from a decision of the PTO' s Board of
Appeals that had held certain claims in an application anticipated under 35 U.S.C. §102. The applicants in In re Boersma47
had, after receiving a decision from the Board of Appeals
giving their means expressions the traditional broad PTO
interpretation, asked the Board to reconsider and clarify its
affirmance of the examiner's rejection, arguing that the language of the last paragraph of section 112 compelled the
narrow, statutory interpretation, and that under such an
interpretation the claims were patentable.
43 Id. at 1444, 221 USPQ at 388 (citing In re Mott, 557 F.2d 266, 269,194 USPQ
305,307 (CCPA 1977) ) (insertions in original).
44 Id. at 1445,221 USPQ 389, footnote 5.
45 Id. (emphasis in original).
46 Id., 221 USPQ at 388 (footnote omitted).
47 No. 84-627 (May 4,1984) (unpublished). See summary at 28 P.T.C.J. 83 (May
24, 1984).
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The Board refused to change its decision, observing
that "[the last paragraph] of Section 112 relates to matters
of infringement, not the interpretation of claims during ex
parte prosecution.' '48
Before the Federal Circuit, the applicants in Boersma
continued to urge that the statutory language compelled a
narrow interpretation of the means expressions. 49 The applicants admitted that Lundberg had squarely decided the
question against them,50 but contended that that case was
wrong as a matter of law.
The Court affirmed the Board in an unpublished decision. It observed that Lundberg did indeed stand for the
opposite rule oflaw urged by the applicants, and that "[t]he
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals repeatedly followed
and applied" that rule. 51 It noted that the Federal Circuit
had previously applied the PTO standard in RCA, and
observed: "Appellants admitted at oral argument that Lundberg supports the Board's decision in this case. They argued
only that Lundberg is wrong. Be that as it may, Lundberg
binds this panel. "52
Perhaps the best example ofthe Federal Circuit's uncertainty over this question is a fourth case, Stewart-Warner
Corp. v. City of Pontiac 53 in which the Court was faced with
an appeal from a district court judgment invalidating a patent
as obvious in view of the prior art.
The litigation in Stewart- Warner has a relatively complex history. The case involved Stewart-Warner Corp.'s
attempts to enforce two patents directed to stadium scoreboards. The accused infringer asserted that both patents
were invalid based on a number of prior art grounds, including a public use or sale under 35 U.S.C. §102(b). In a first
trial, limited to the issues of public use or sale, the district
court found both inventions to be anticipated. 54

48 [d., slip op. at 3 (insertions in original).
49 [d.
50 [d., slip op. at 4.
51 [d.

52 [d., slip op. at 4-5.
53 767 F.2d 1563,226 USPQ 676 (1985).
54 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 213 USPQ 453 (E.n. Mich. 1981).
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Stewart-Warner's appeal from the judgment went to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, that court not yet having
been divested of jurisdiction over the case by the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982.55 The Sixth Circuit affirmed
the invalidity of one patent. Because of an admission by the
patent owner, whether the second patent was also anticipated depended on whether the structures defined by the
preamble and paragraph (h) of the broadest claim of the
second patent were present in the art device. Paragraph (h)
recited
clock means for operating [writing and applying functions] on a
real time basis at a data transmission rate sufficiently greater than
the frequency of the periodic power waveform that said applying
means completely applies the decoded intensity level information
to the selected display devices during the occurrence of each
power waveform interval ....

The Sixth Circuit differed sharply with the district court
over the proper scope to be assigned to paragraph h in
reversing as to the second patent. 56
[T]he District Court's interpretation ... reads element h of Claim
1 without regard to the specifications [sic] ....
It is proper to construe element h in light of the specification
because to do so does not alter or expand what is claimed, but
rather explains it. ... The specifications explain the structure and
materials used to provide the necessary means; they do not add a
new element which is not found in the claims. Claims phrased in
terms of "means" such as that used in the second patent are
common, and could always be subject to a challenge for specificity
if not construed to be limited to the structure recited in the specifications. Indeed, several courts have approved such a construction of "means" claims. See Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data
Corp., 550 F.2d 992 [, 193 USPQ 257] (4th Cir. 1977); Hale Fire
Pump Co. v. Tokai Ltd., 614 F.2d 1278 [, 205 USPQ 114] (CCPA
1980).

55 Pub. L. No. 97-164, Section 127(a), 96 Stat. 37-39 Apr. 2, 1982; codified at
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1295.
56 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 717 F.2d 269, 219 USPQ 1162
(1983).
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When we consider element h in light of the specifications it is
clear that the [prior art device] did not anticipate the invention
disclosed by the [second] patent ....
Although the prior art system performed the same functions recited in paragraph (h), the court continued,
[t]he specifications make clear that the second patent uses a much
different method ... than the [prior art].57
The Sixth Circuit's decision not to invalidate claim 1 despite
the recognition that the function recited in the means expression did not differ from that of the prior art, along with its
citations to the Technitrol and Hale-Fire Pump cases, clearly
indicate that the court determined the scope of the means
expression through a rigorous application of the statutory
language along the lines advocated in this article.
On remand the district court in a second opinion again
found the claim including element (h) invalid, this time as
obvious over the prior device.
On appeal from this second district court decision, a
divided Federal Circuit reversed the District Court, accusing
it of "ignor[ing] the law of the case" by refusing the interpret
the scope of paragraph (h) narrowly according to the statutory standard mandated by the Sixth Circuit. The district
court's reuse of the broad interpretation it had used in the
first decision, the Federal Circuit said, was
contrary to the decision of the Sixth Circuit, and cannot be sustained. The Sixth Circuit held that both the result achieved by the
[second] patent, and the method of achieving it, differed from that
of the [prior art] .... The prior appellate review and determination of certain issues, including claim construction, foreclosed the
opportunity to re-determine those issues. Neither party has demonstrated that the evidence presented on remand was substantially
different, or that manifest injustice required an exception to the
law of the case doctrine. 58
The narrower scope of paragraph (h) was therefore reinstated, without further discussion of the legal merits of each

57 Id. at 378,219 USPQ at 1169.
58 767 F.2d at 1567-68,226 USPQ at 678-79 (citations omitted).
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method of interpretation, and the claim was held valid over
the prior art.
The dissent stated:
I do not agree that this court is bound by the law of the case on
the basis of the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Stewart- Warner
Corp. v. City ojPontiac, 717 F.2d 269, 219 USPQ 1162 (1983) that
the second patent is not invalid for anticipation. Although some
deference must be given the Sixth Circuit, this should not be
expanded to law of the case effect where the decision of the Sixth
Circuit was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice. 59
The dissent went on to discuss the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the preamble, arguing that that interpretation was
clearly erroneous. It urged that the second patent be found
anticipated by the prior art system.
It is clear from Stewart-Warner that the Federal
Circuit assigned the means expression of element (h) a narrow scope in accordance with the statutory method of interpretation. Somewhat less clear, however, are the method
and the exact reasons used by that court to arrive at the
decision to follow that direction of the statutory language.
The majority of Stewart-Warner saw itself as bound
under the law-of-the-case doctrine to the claim interpretation announced by the Sixth Circuit. However, as both they
and the dissent recognized, prior Federal Circuit case law
provides for exceptions to the binding effect of that doctrine.
Central Soya Co. v. Hormel & CO.,60 the leading case on
the law-of-the-case doctrine in the Federal Circuit, also
involved a challenge in that court to the binding effect of a
prior decision of a regional circuit court of appeals. In rejecting that challenge as barred by the doctrine, the Federal
Circuit noted that if the earlier decision "was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice' '61 the doctrine
would not operate.
The legal reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, although sound,
appears to be contrary to the clear weight of prior law in

59 Id. at 1592, 226 USPQ at 682.
60 723 F.2d 1573, 220 USPQ 490 (1983).
61 Id. at 1580, 220 USPQ at 495 (quoting from White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428,
431 (5th Cir. 1967) ).
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this area. As discussedabove,62 the use of the statutory
method of interpretation to determine the scope of a means
expression is contrary to a long line of cases in the CCPA
dealing with prosecution proceedings, the authority of which
continued to be controlling to the Court in Boersma. Assuming that no valid difference between the choice of interpretive methods in patentability and validity can be supported,
these cases strongly suggest that the interpretation of the
means expression in paragraph (h) made by the Sixth Circuit
and given effect by the Federal Circuit in Stewart- Warner
is contrary to the current rule. It is thus far from clear that
the Sixth Circuit's claim interpretation was not clearly in
error.
Furthermore, the district court's two successive invalidations of the claim when the means expression was interpreted according to the established PTO approach suggest
a strong possibility that the choice of interpretive method
determined the outcome of the validity challenge in StewartWarner. The failure to invalidate a claim due to a legally
incorrect claim interpretation would seem to qualify as
"manifest injustice." Under these circumstances, one would
expect to encounter very serious doubts whether the ruling
of the Sixth Circuit would be followed under the law-of-thecase doctrine.
Instead, the majority found this exception unavailable,
devoting only a few brief remarks to the topic. The court
did not cite any authority supporting the correctness of the
Sixth Circuit's interpretation, and in fact did not even state
that the interpretation was correct. Neither did it acknowledge the prior case law to the contrary.
Finally, in a very recent decision, the Federal Circuit
explicitly adopted the statutory method of interpreting means
expressions over an accused infringer's protestations. In
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 the court addressed
an appeal from a district court opinion holding seven of
Polaroid's patents valid and infringed.

62 See footnote 20, supra, and accompanying text.
63 No. 86-604 (April 25, 1986),
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One of the patents contained a claim which included a
recitation of a
first film-advancing means adapted to extend into [an] opening
for engaging [the] foremost film unit at [the] second edge thereof
and moving said foremost film unit, subsequent to exposure, through
[the] exit. 64
The court described Kodak as arguing that "[t]he district
court ... improperly limited the element 'first film-advancing means' ... to a preferred embodiment in the [patent]
specification ... , and permitted that 'narrow' construction
to dominate its analysis of the prior art. Kodak says that
was contrary to § 112, which requires that means-pIus-function claims be construed to encompass 'equivalents', citing
D.M.I., Inc. v. John Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1573,225
USPQ 236, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1985). It says prior art structures
that perform the function of a 'first film advancing means'
render obvious the inventions set forth in the claims .... ' '65
Apparently, the Federal Circuit understood Kodak to argue
that the means expression should be interpreted to include
not only the corresponding structure in the specification of
the patent, but also a range of equivalents wide enough to
result in the traditional, broad interpretation that would be
assigned under the PTO view, thus allowing the claim to be
invalidated more easily.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with Kodak.
[A]s stated in D.M.I., § 112 requires "that the limitation shall be
construed to cover the structure described in the specification and
equivalents thereof." 775 F .2d at 1574, 225 USPQ at 238 (emphasis
in original). Here, as an initial matter, the district court properly
construed "first film advancing means" in light of the structure
described in the specification .... It went on to note, however,
Polaroid's statement to the PTO during prosecution that the claims
were limited to a rear pick that engaged the film unit ... only at
the trailing 'edge.' ... Kodak has not shown error in the district
court's finding that, in view of that prosecution history, it was
compelled to read the claims as limited to a rear pick .... We will

64 [d., slip op. at 34.
65 [d., slip op. at 35.

-264-

HeinOnline -- 68 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 264 1986

Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society
not "undertake the speculative inquiry" into why the limitation
was entered, or whether it was directed to one purpose Kodak
alleges (i.e., "avoiding deflection of the leading end of the film
unit out of alignment with the cassette's exit slot"), but not to
others. C/. Kinzenbaw v. John Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389,
222 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, _ U.S. _ ,
105 S. Ct. 1357 (1985). Thus, whether applied in determining
validity or infringement, the broad scope argued in Kodak's brief
would be inappropriate. 66

The court thus explicitly adopted the statutory method
of interpreting the means expression, in what appears to be
a considered decision not to use the urged PTO paradigm.
In doing so, it applied a precedent, the D.M.I. decision,
which dealt exclusively with the question of how means
expressions are to be interpreted during infringement, not
validity, determinations. In its opinion, the court did not
even acknowledge the existence of the numerous contrary
binding precedents on the question, let alone suggest reasons why they did not control the situation before the court.
The observations lead one to wonder just how influential the quoted portion of Kodak will become in the future.
On the one hand, the decision does appear to be another
instance in which the Federal Circuit has applied the statutory method of interpretation to a means expression in the
context of patentability or validity. On the other hand, the
opinion seems to evidence an unawareness of the near unanimity with which the court's precedents have come to the
opposite conclusion. Moreover, the self-professed inability
of the Federal Circuit to overturn its precedents through
decisions of three-judge panels,67 such as that in Kodak,
renders the ability of Kodak to overrule the precedential
value of decisions such as Arbeit and Lundberg questionable.

66 ld., slip op. at 36 (citations to lower court decision omitted).
67 See, e.g., SRllnternational v. Matsushita Electric Corp., 775 F.2d ll07,
1125, 227 USPQ 577, 589 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (in banc action taken to overturn dicta
in decision by prior three-judge panel).
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IV.
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION

In view of the unsettled precedents from the Federal
Circuit on this issue, and the meager discussion in those
precedents of the policies involved, it is appropriate to
examine in some detail the arguments supporting the use of
both the PTO and statutory methods of interpretation. Such
an examination is the only means by which a reasoned choice
between the two alternatives can be made, and it is submitted that such a reasoned choice will select the statutory
standard.
A. The Statutory Standard
There are essentially two major reasons to strictly apply
the language of section 112' s last paragraph to means expressions during prosecution. First, the statutory language itself
compels a strict application. The sixth paragraph of section
112 directs what a claim including a means expression "shall
be construed to cover." It does not expressly draw a distinction between the phases of prosecution and enforcement,68 or between validity and infringement. The language
facially includes a district court determining not only
infringement, but validity as well, and also provides no basis
for excluding the PTO from those who "shall" apply the
statutory direction. In the absence of strong indications or
policies to the contrary, the statute itself militates against
.
the PTO's approach.
Second, applying the statutory language throughout the
entire lifespan of a claim results in the claim being assigned
a consistent scope. Under such an application, the boundaries of the subject matter defined by the claim are the same
during the determination of both validity and infringement.
Consequently, an apparatus that would have anticipated a
claim, if it had been prior art, will infringe the claim after it
issues.

68 A discussion of the possible implications to be drawn from the presence of
the word "cover" is reserved until later in this article. See text at notes 81-101,
infra.
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The PTO's approach does not produce such symmetry.
Instead, the scope of a means expression during prosecution
is radically different from its scope during infringement. To
illustrate this, consider the following example. Assume that
an applicant has initially presented a claim to the PTO incorporating a means expression that, if interpreted according
to the statutory language, covers only novel and unobvious
subject matter that he has enabled an ordinary artisan to
make and use. Since there is no dispute as to the sixth
paragraph's application in matters of infringement, if allowed
his claim will enable him to exclude only those activities
that patentees have traditionally held rights over. Let us
further assume the not unreasonable existence of a prior art
device which anticipates all the elements of the claim other
than the disputed means expression, and is also capable of
performing the function recited in the claim. However, this
device does not meet one of the other two requirements of
Graver Tank; either it does not perform the function in
substantially the same way as the corresponding structure
in our applicant's specification, or does not achieve the same
result. The examiner properly performs his duty as interpreted by the PTO, and rejects the claim over the prior art,
stating that he will not allow the claim as long as it continues
to read on a function that the prior art device is capable of
performing.
The applicant here is faced with an unpalatable decision. The examiner in most cases could be satisfied by a
substitution of structural limitations not found in the reference for the offending means expression. However, this runs
the risk of depriving the applicant of at least some of the
equivalents he originally sought, both because he is no longer
using a means expression with its statutorily defined scope,
and because he has just set up an unpleasant issue of prosecution history estoppel precisely as to the element he sought
to claim broadly.
Alternatively, the applicant could more specifically recite
the function to the point where the applied device could no
longer perform it. While he retains in this latter case the
equivalents provided by the statutory language, in narrowing his function he has probably skewed the Graver Tank
analysis to a point where he can no longer reach infringing
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activities that he could have reached under his old claim
language, either because the function now corresponds to a
more elaborate structure in his specification than it did before,
or because the elements in any accused device must now
perform a more precise function.
In either case, the result is that the applicant, once he
becomes a patentee, no longer has an exclusive right of the
same scope originally sought. Opponents will point out that
this happens every time a claim is narrowed to avoid the
prior art, but in this case the claim was already narrow
enough to avoid being infringed by any prior art or obvious
combination of prior art.
The patent system generally reflects the policy decision
that the public good will be advanced by granting an exclusive right to an inventor covering any eligible subject matter
that is both novel and unobvious. It is difficult to see how
the further restriction of his patent rights within these statutory boundaries in the above example furthers this policy
in any way. To prevent an inventor from securing the full
extent of the patent grant because of the unpatentability of
subject matter he has not invented, and over which he is not
seeking to obtain an exclusionary right, would seem to do
violence to any orderly implementation of this policy.
B. The PTO Standard
Three arguments are usually brought forward to justify
the PTO's liberal "reads on" test to means expressions.
1. The most compelling argument in favor of the PTO' s
method of interpretation is the long line of cases from the
CCPA that have announced it and applied it since the '52
Act became effective. 69 Chief among these case are the Arbeit
and Lundberg decisions discussed above.
But the rationale of these cases is immediately troubling. The Court in Lundberg argued that an application of
the last paragraph to means expressions during prosecution
would destroy a distinction between broad and narrow claims.

69 E.g., In re Mott, 557 F.2d 266, 194 USPQ 305 (1977); In re Magaroli, et al.,
318 F.2d 348, 138 USPQ 158 (1963); In re Henatsch, 244 F.2d 542, 113 USPQ 530
(1957); In re Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947, 99 USPQ 123 (1953).
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In doing so, it ignored that paragraph's express direction
that means expressions be construed to cover "the corresponding structure ... and equivalents thereof. " Assuming
that the corresponding structure has equivalents of some
sort, the breadth of a means expression interpreted in accordance with the statutory language will always be greater
than that of a detailed recitation of the corresponding element. The dispute is not as to whether such an expression
is any broader than a detailed recitation of the exact structure, but rather how much broader it is.
Courts faced with interpreting means expressions in
infringement settings have been aware that that language
affords a different, broader coverage as compared to structural recitations ofthe corresponding element,7° Contrary to
the Court's assertion in Lundberg, an application of the
statutory language to means expressions during prosecution
would give the same result.
More importantly, the court's observation in Lundberg
and Arbeit that the claims themselves must define the invention without limitations imported from other sources begs
the question to be answered. If the last paragraph of section
112 determines the meaning assigned to a means expression
during prosecution, then that expression already includes
the corresponding structure and its equivalents. They are
not "limitations in the specification not included in the claim";
they are part of the claim by virtue of their inclusion in the
specification and they do not need to be "imported" into
the claim to impart patentability.
Conversely, if one initially decides that the sixth paragraph will not govern such expressions during prosecution,
and therefore the scope of the claim will be limited only by
its literal language, it follows necessarily that the corresponding structure and equivalents are not part of the claimed

70 E.g., Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Products, supra, note 14; Lockheed
Aircraft v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 193 USPQ 560 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Stearns v.
Tinker & Rasor, supra, note 10; Courtesy Communications Corp. v. C-Five, Inc.,
455 F.Supp. 1183,203 USPQ 276 (N.D. TX 1978); Technicon Instruments Corp.
v. Coleman Instruments, Inc., 255 F.Supp. 630, 150 USPQ 227 (N.D. Ill. 1966),
affd. 385 F.2d 391,155 USPQ 369 (7th Cir. 1967).
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subject matter. But that is not a justification for making the
decision in the first place. After all, changing the conclusion
(the last paragraph does not apply) would erase the result
relied on (the claim does not contain the needed limitations).
Yet this is exactly what the Court used to justify its holding.
Further, the rationale of these cases appears to conflict
with another, related CCPA precedent. In In re Knowlton,71
the CCPA was confronted with the PTO's rejection, under
the first paragraph of section 112, of a claim drawn to a
specifically programmed general purpose computer. The claim
recited a series of means for performing the functions carried
out by the particular program. In support of its rejection,
the PTO stated that the claim would "preempt . . . every
possible hardware configuration that would give the same
result . . . notwithstanding the absence of an adequate
teaching of any such hardware disclosure by [the] specification. "72
In its opinion, the Court embarked on a detailed discussion of section 112, and stated that the first paragraph
requires, in part, a disclosure such that' 'the skilled artisan
. . . sufficiently understand the manner of making and
. . .using the invention .... The invention subject to scrutiny by the Patent Office ... is the invention defined by the
claims .... "
The Court then turned to a discussion of the last paragraph of section 112 and its authorization of means expressions. "If the applicant chooses to use such language, the
statute instructs the ... Patent Office ... as to how such
language shall be interpreted. It states that such language
'shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure ...
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.' ''73
Because the specification disclosed an apparatus that complied with the claims, and the claims were in tum limited to
covering that structure and its equivalents, the Court held
that the disclosure was sufficiently enabling and reversed
the rejection.

71 481 F.2d 1357, 178 USPQ 486 (1973).
72 ld. at 1362, 178 USPQ at 490.
73 ld. at 1366, 178 USPQ at 492 (original emphasis omitted).
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The continuing vitality of this view in the Federal Circuit was apparently reaffirmed by In re Hyatt, 74 in which
the Court was faced with the rejection of a claim reciting
only a single means. The Board of Appeals had affirmed the
examiner's rejection under the second paragraph of section
112, asserting that because of its single-means format, the
claim failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the
invention.
The Court disagreed with the Board's application of the
statute.
The proper statutory rejection of a single means claim is the
requirement of the first paragraph of section 112 that the enabling
disclosure of the specification be commensurate in scope with the
claim under consideration.
The long-recognized problem with a single means claim is that it
covers every conceivable means for achieving the stated result,
while the specification discloses at most only those means known
to the inventor. Thus, the claim is properly rejected ... based on
the first paragraph of § 112. 7S

This language at first appears to run counter to the
limited scope assigned to means expressions during enablement determinations in KnowLton. However, the court in
Hyatt specifically limited its remarks.
The final paragraph of § 112 saves combination claims drafted using
means-plus-function format from this [enablement] problem by
providing a construction of that format narrow enough to avoid
the problem of undue breadth as forbidden by the first paragraph. 76

The court therefore squarely reiterated the standard of
interpretation described in KnowLton, with the proviso that
it be applied to combination claims.
It is very difficult to reconcile the reasoning applied in
KnowLton and Hyatt with that of Arbeit and Lundberg. If
the literal claim language defines the invention to be compared to the prior art, as both Arbeit and Lundberg hold,
why not require that same invention to be accompanied by

74 708 F.2d 712,218 USPQ 195 (1983).
75 [d. at 714,218 USPQ at 197 (footnote omitted).
76 [d. at 715,218 USPQ at 197 (emphasis in original).
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an enabling disclosure? On the other hand, if, as Knowlton
and Hyatt hold, the applicant's duty to enable is restricted
to the invention defined by the claims construed in accordance with the last paragraph of section 112, what rationale
could require the use of a different claimed invention for the
purposes of applying sections 102 and 103? No reason is
apparent, nor has any been suggested.
2. The second argument urges that the PTO position is
consistent with the well settled rule of claim construction
giving claims during prosecution their' 'broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification. "77 The general reason behind this rule is that an applicant, within certain constraints, is able to amend his claim language as he
pleases. Consequently, if he wishes to argue for a more
restrictive interpretation of his claim language, his remedy
is to so amend the claim and make the intended coverage
explicit, rather than relying on nuance and disputed meanings. 78 Interpreting a means expression during prosecution
to include all structures capable of performing the recited
function, the argument continues, is simply to give the claim
its broadest reasonable interpretation, in accordance with
this time-tested rule.
There are problems with this justification as well. As
an initial matter, accepting the "broadest reasonable interpretation" rule does not necessarily require acceptance of
the PTO's interpretation of means expressions.
Instead, it would be entirely consistent with the policies
behind that rule to use the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim construed according to the statutory language. This would involve, for example, determining the
broadest reasonable limits of the corresponding structure in
the specification, whether the results achieved by the prior
art can reasonably be considered the same as that achieved
by the applicant's structure, and so on. The "broadest

77 E.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393,1404-05,163 USPQ 541,550 (CCPA 1969)
and cases cited therein.
78 E.g., In re Reuter, 651 F.2d 751,756,210 USPQ 249,253-54 (CCPA 1981);
Prater at 1405, 162 USPQ at 550.
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reasonable interpretation" rule, while persuasively arguing
that the normal rules of claim interpretation should be altered
during prosecution, is not sufficient to compel their transformation into the PTO's test. It is not at all clear that
interpreting a claim during prosecution according to an analysis that will never again be even remotely applied to it after
issuance is reasonable.
The support provided by this rationale falls short for
another, more fundamental reason. Unlike the case where
the "broadest reasonable interpretation" rule is applied to
claims literally reciting the structure comprising the element
claimed, the example discussed above 79 points out that the
patent applicant using a means expression may not be free
to amend his claim to the extent necessary to avoid the prior
art applied under the PTO test. Forced to address prior art
disclosures during prosecution having no proximity whatsoever to the boundaries of infringement, an applicant may
be unable to avoid relinquishing valuable and deserved
exclusive rights.
Finally, even if one were to accept the "broadest
reasonable interpretation" rule as adequate support for the
PTO's approach to means expressions, it provides no support for the use of that approach when determining the
validity of an already issued patent. Absent a reissue or
reexamination proceeding, a patentee has no ability to alter
his claim language to make his intended scope of protection
clearer. Consequently, the basis for the rule disappears.
In fact, the Federal Circuit has on at least one occasion
stated that issued claims are to be construed, if possible, so
as to preserve their validity. 80 This view is in direct opposition to use of the "broadest reasonable interpretation"
rule after issuance.
3. The third argument urges that the PTO's interpretation more accurately reflects the intent behind the statute.
In other words, the last paragraph of section 112 was not
intended to apply to prosecution. As evidence of this, ref-

79 Page 267.
80 Carman Industries, Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 937, 220 USPQ 481, 485
(Fed. Cir. 1984).

-273-

HeinOnline -- 68 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 273 1986

June 1986, Vol. 68, No.6

erence is usually made to a brief portion of P. J. Federico's
commentary on the '52 Act, in which he states that the last
paragraph of section 112
relates primarily to the construction of. . . claims for the purpose
of determining when the claim is infringed (note the use of the
word "cover"), and would not appear to have much, if any,
applicability in determining the patentability of such claims over
the prior art, that is, the Patent Office is not authorized to allow a
claim which "reads on" the prior art. Sl

Since Mr. Federico was one of the primary authors of the
'52 Act, this passage is argued to authoritatively reveal what
was intended by that paragraph.
Again, serious problems appear in this argument. Generally, "the test most often declared by the courts" is "that
the legislative will governs decisions on the construction of
statutes. ' '82 Questions of statutory construction are decided
according to the criteria of what the legislature intended the
language of the particular measure under scrutiny to mean. 83
Some cases use maxims of interpretation, such as the
"plain meaning rule,"84 or other formulistic approaches to
this essentially factual inquiry. However, probably the most
useful synthesis of the case law is one which views all the
evidence available, including the language of the statute, its
legislative history, and the policies behind it, in light of the
degree to which each piece is probative of the legislature's
actual intent and the strength with which each argues for a
particular interpretation. 85
As argued above, 86 the language of the last paragraph
of § 112 appears clear on its face. That clarity argues strongly

81 Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1,26, (1954 ed.).
82 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 45.05 (4th ed. 1984).
83 E.g., Philbrook v. Glopgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
458 (1974).
84 See generally 2A Sutherland, § 46.01.
85 E.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. S.E.c., 119 F.2d 730,738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 618 (1941). See U.S. v. National Marine Engineer's Beneficial Association, 294 F.2d 385, 391 (2d Cir. 1961).
86 Page 266.
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that the legislature intended to enact a measure that would
govern the interpretation of claims both during validity and
infringement. Although Mr. Federico apparently would have
had us believe otherwise, the word "cover" in common
parlance is not associated solely with infringement determinations, as for example in the statement: "The claim is
not patentable because it is broad enough to cover subject
matter that would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill. " Few would agree that the term' 'invention," as used
in 35 U .S.C. §§ 102 and 103, means the invention "covered
by the claim. "87
As also argued above, no rational policy behind the
patent system is served by applying the PTO's interpretation
to means expressions.
Among the other factors to be considered is the legislative history surrounding the '52 Act, including Mr. Federico's commentary, which has been argued by some to
support the PTO's interpretation. However, a reasoned review
of this material shows the support to be largely illusory.
As an initial matter, Mr. Federico's commentary is not
part of the legislative history of the ' 52 Act. During the
legislative activities leading to the Act's passage, Mr. Federico was a Patent Office employee working with the House
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. 88
He was not an elected member of Congress, nor did he, in
his function as commentator for West Publishing's United
States Code Annotated, speak for any portion of the legislative branch.
As he states, his commentary was prepared "after the
new patent act ['52 Act] was approved," and "is a consideration and revision of ... transcriptions of address[es to]

87 In re Muchmore, 433 F.2d 824,826,167 USPQ 681,683 (CCPA 1970) (affirming rejection under 103). E.g., Julie Research Laboratories, Inc. v. Guideline
Instruments, Inc., SOl F.2d 1131, 1135, 183 USPQ I, 4 (2d Cir. 1974) (claim
including means expression invalidated under 103); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S.,
640 F.2d 1193, 1210, 205 USPQ 381, 392 (Ct. CI. 1980) (claim invalidated under
102(b) ).
88 G. Rich, Congressional Intent-Or Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?
reprinted in J. Witherspoon, Nonobviousness-The Ultimate Condition of Patentability 1: 1,3-5 (1978).

-275-

HeinOnline -- 68 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 275 1986

June 1986, Vol. 68, No.6

various patent groups. "89 Its full text was therefore not even
in existence when the legislature considered the measure,
and can hardly be probative of the intent in the minds of
legislators at that time. As stated by Professor Singer, no
method of statutory interpretation "can be supported when
[it] result[s] in a finding of legislative intent which did not in
fact exist within the legislature."90
The mistaken authority given to Mr. Federico's commentary seems to stem from a confusion between his status
as a textual author of the '52 Act's provisions, and the
legislator's status as legal authors in voting on it. It is the
intent of the legislators which is at issue in statutory interpretation, and Mr. Federico's commentary, to the extent
that it is more relevant than any other person's views, must
trace its authority to that source.
It has been often stated that the later views expressed
by a legislator concerning the intent behind a statute are not
sufficiently probative of legislative intent. 91 The courts,
including the CCPA, have recognized that, a fortiori, the
post-enactment views expressed by "a draftsman of the
legislation" are "of little value in the interpretation of [a]
statute. "92
89 Commentary, 35 U.S.C.A. at 1-2.
90 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 45.05 (4th ed. 1984).
91 E.g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102,
n.13 (1980); U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1947); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir.), cerr. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980);
Allyn v. U.S., 461 F.2d 810 (Ct. Cl. 1972); U.S. School of Aeronautics v. U.S.,
142 F.Supp. 933, 938 (Ct. Cl. 1956). See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35
(1982).
92 Department of Energy v. Westland, 565 F.2d 685, 690-91, 196 USPQ 3, 7
(CCPA 1977). E.g., Iowa State Research Foundation, Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp.,
444 F.2d 406, 170 USPQ 394 (4th Cir. 1970) (specific to Mr. Federico's commentary); Friedman v. U.S., 364 F. Supp. 484, 488 (S.D. Ga. 1973); California Welfare
Rights Organization v. Richardson, 348 F.Supp. 491 (N.D. Calif. 1972); Epstein
v. Rasor, 296 F. Supp 214, 216 (N. D. Calif. 1969); 2A Sutherland, § 48.12. "I
believed the worst person to construe [a statute] is the person who is responsible
for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with
the effect of the language which has in fact been employed. At the time he drafted
the statute, at all events, he may have been under the impression that he had given
full effect to what was intended, but he may be mistaken in construing it afterwards
just because what was in his mind was what was intended, though, perhaps, it was
not done." Hilder v. Dexter, AC 474 (1902). Cf Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102 n.13 (1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611
F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Moreover, Mr. Federico adds the disclaimer:
In such an extended discussion it is. obviously impossible to avoid
expressions . . . of personal opinion and it should be understood
that the paper [commentary] contains some opinions and views of
the writer even though not always labelled as such. 93

We therefore cannot even be sure whether any given portion
of his commentary represents his view of what the legislature intended, or instead is his personal opinion of what the
particular language ought to mean. 94
On the other hand, the House Report discussing the
bill95 was drafted by Mr. Federico for that body and adopted
by it. It can therefore be considered more highly probative
of the legislature's intent. The text of the Report refers to
Section 112 in only one sentence:
The next group of sections [Chapter 11] relates to the application
for a patent. 96

The text does not specifically mention the last paragraph of
§112 at all. Clearly, it enunciates no view ofthe paragraph's
effect on prosecution corresponding to the PTO's reading
of Mr. Federico's commentary.
The Senate Report97 is nearly identical to that of the
House, differing only in a matter not relevant to this discussion. 98
The Revision Notes accompanying the House Report,
also written by Mr. Federico, do specifically mention the
disputed paragraph. The entire passage reads: "A new paragraph relating to functional claims is added.' '99
None of these "official" materials contains the slightest
evidence of the intent supposedly referred to by Mr. Federico in his unofficial commentary. By failing to even men93 Commentary, 35 V.S.C.A. at 2.
94 It has even been intimated that no legislative intent adhered to much of the
'52 Act. Congressional Intent at 1:12-13.
95 H. Rep. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., (1952), reprinted at 34 J.P.O.S.
549 (1952).
96 34 J.P.O.S. at 557.
97 S. Rep. No. 1979, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., (1952), reprinted in 1952 V.S. Code
Congo & Ad. News 2394.
98 Congressional Intent at 1: 10, n.16.
99 34 J.P.O.S. at 591.
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tion the effect he asserts, they argue instead that Congress
did not intend that the PTO interpretation result, and that
that interpretation was made by Mr. Federico sometime
after the bill's enactment.
This view finds further support from another of the
statute's coauthors, C. J. Zinn, who also commented on
the'52 Act. 100 He states that the paragraph
recognizes the validity of combination claims wherein the novelty
is expressed in functional terms. It offsets the theory of the Halliburton case but does not go so far as to permit the use of single
means claims. 101

Mr. Zinn's commentary does not assert any difference
between the paragraph's application to infringement and
prosecution.
In short, Mr. Federico's commentary is the only source
discussing the statutory language that even remotely suggests any validation of the PTO's interpretation. Its citation
on this point is some evidence of the interpretation Mr.
Federico thought the language should have had some time
after the enactment of the paragraph. However, it is exceedingly thin evidence of Congress's intent in enacting that
language.
Finally, the language ofMr. Federico's commentary is
itself equivocal. He states that the paragraph relates "primarily" to infringement. Does this mean that, in spite ofthe
seemingly express language ofthat paragraph, it relates only
to infringement? Or does it instead indicate that the paragraph "secondarily" relates to matters before the PTO,
reflecting Mr. Federico's view that overturning Halliburton
is its most important, but not only, function?
He states that the paragraph' 'would not appear to have
much applicability" to proceedings before the PTO (emphasis added), instead of stating that the paragraph definitely
does not apply. Does this indicate that the statement is one
of personal opinion rather than the intent he perceived to be
behind the legislation? What is his authority for the assertion
100 Commentary on New Title35, U.S. Code "Patents", reprinted in 1952 U.S.
Code Congo & Ad. News 2509.
101 [d. at 2514.
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that "the Patent Office is not authorized to allow a claim
which 'reads on' the prior art?" Certainly that result does
not stem from any language in the paragraph under discussion. If it finds a basis in some other portion of the statute,
it is odd that the statement should appear at this point,
without even a cross reference to the specific supporting
language.
In sum, the reasons advanced in support of the PTO's
method of interpreting means expressions do not appear to
be well-grounded. They are based, in the case of the early
decisions of Arbeit and Lundberg, on an incomplete and
incoherent understanding of how the relevant statutory provisions function. In the case of arguments using the' 'broadest reasonable interpretation" or similar rules, they evidence an insufficient appreciation of the costs that are imposed·
on patent owners by the lack of symmetry inherent in the
PTO's method. Mr. Federico's commentary fails to support
the PTO's method for two reasons. First, it is not proper
legislative history. Second, it does not even, by its own
terms, assert that the legislative history of the '52 Act requires
an application of the PTO method.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion illustrates that the Federal
Circuit has failed to come to grips with this problem adequately. As a result, even after reviewing the recent Federal
Circuit decisions on the point, the patent bar is essentially
unable to predict what method of interpretation that court
will use to determine the scope of a means expression being
compared against the prior art.
The lack of any discussion of the policies underlying
this issue, and the failure of the court to confront its binding
precedents in the published opinions, has created uncertainty whether the Federal Circuit is discarding the questionable precedents of Arbeit and Lundberg. Arbeit and
Lundberg dealt with pre-grant patentability determinations,
not the post-grant validity determinations in RCA, StewartWarner and Kodak. Do the treatments of the means expressions in Stewart- Warner and Kodak indicate that the Federal
Circuit does not feel its earlier precedents extend to this
area of its jurisdiction, and that the statutory rule of inter-
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pretation should apply? Yet the adoption of such a fundamental difference in claim interpretation between validity
and prosecution would seem to be both intellectually unsound
and unprecedented. Or perhaps the language in Mulder, a
case involving a pending application, indicates that the correctness of the early precedents is being called into question?
Patent practitioners will have to await an explicit treatment of the issue in a published opinion to determine whether
the Federal Circuit will continue to use the strained, overly
restrictive interpretation of the last paragraph of section 112
based on highly questionable precedents, or whether the
court's increasing familiarity with the interpretation given
means expressions in infringement determinations and the
practical benefits of symmetrical claim interpretation will
lead it to throw off the unwarranted vestiges of pre-1952
case law in this area.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Readers may wish to consider the impact, if
any, of In re Yamamoto, 222 USPQ 934,936 (Fed. 1984) on the
author's discussion of the PTO position appearing at pp. 268-273
above. Following the Prater and Reuter decisions there mentioned, the Federal Circuit rejected appellant's argument which
would require the PTO to apply a rule of claim construction adopted
by the federal courts when the validity of an issued patent is in
question. Instead, the Court affirmed "the board's decision to
give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation, consistent
with the specification, in reexamination proceedings."

-280-

HeinOnline -- 68 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 280 1986

